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ABSTRACT 
In an influential article, “Unraveling in Matching Markets,” Li and Rosen (1998) note that 
the first 7 picks, and 17 among 29 first-round selections, of the 1997 National Basketball 
Association (NBA) draft were not college seniors. By 2004, the first pick was a high 
school senior, and 25 of the first 29 picks were not college seniors.We suggest that recent 
NBA contract provisions implemented to slow the early entry of talented players have 
instead provided additional incentives to both players and firms for early entry into the 
NBA.We explore two competing models that predict why teams choose a talented player 
sooner in the new rookie contract system: the human capital model and Lazear’s option 
value model. To test why unraveling occurs, we use a panel study of all NBA players for 
12 years, from 1989 through 2002. 
  
In the pursuit of the best qualified worker, unraveling may occur in the labor market 
(Li&Rosen, 1998; Roth, 1991; Roth&Xing, 1994). In the literature, two types 
of unraveling are identified. The first type is identified as jumping-the-gun unraveling, 
which occurs when offers are made earlier and earlier around a central clearing 
time. Examples of this type include early admissions at colleges and hiring of MBA 
candidates. The second type occurs when offers are extended early and workers do 
not join the firm until a later period. Examples of this type generally come from 
educational markets, where firms hire workers a year or 2 years before their education 
is complete. 
On the surface, the National Basketball Association (NBA) labor market seems 
like a good example of the second type of unraveling. In this instance, the NBA has 
a centralized matching system to hire new talent: the NBA draft. Teams in the pursuit 
of talent have drafted players earlier and earlier in their college careers or from 
high school, but here is where the similarity ends. In the unraveling model, once a 
match has been made, workers complete their education and then report towork. In 
the NBA draft, players once drafted start playing without finishing their education. 
Why does early entry occur? We suggest two models predict early entry into the 
draft: human capital and option value. The human capital model suggests that players 
enter the NBA once a certain skill level is obtained. Thus, highly talented players 
reach the NBA earlier because they do not need as much experience as do less 
talented players. The option value model suggests that college basketball provides 
signals for players. Therefore, the longer a player stays in college, the better the signal. 
Teams will then choose players who have a more varied signal (less college 
experience) if they can minimize the downside risk and capitalize on the upside 
potential. 
 
In the first section, we outline the history of the NBA collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) to establish how monopsonistic exploitation has increased with 
the rookie contract. In this section, we explore how institutional and contract structures 
have increased unraveling in the NBA draft. In the second section, we model 
the early entry decision for both players and firms and then focus on testable implications 
of both human capital and option value models of early entry. In the third 
section, we conclude with policy implications. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF NBA CBAS AFFECTING EARLY ENTRY 
 
A Supreme Court ruling in the Haywood v. NBA case in 1971 voided the requirement 
that entrants into the NBA draft wait until their college class graduated. For a 
brief period, the NBA allowed only early entrants who requested and were approved 
entry based on financial hardship; in 1975, the NBA dropped the hardship 
criteria. The figures in Table 1 indicate that from 1976 through the 1994 draft, only 
18.1% of the first-round draft picks were early or foreign entrants; of these early 
entrants, 79.5% of the first-round draft picks into the NBA were college juniors. 
The only foreign first-round picks were Arvydas Sabonis, the star center on the 
Soviet Union gold medal Olympic team of 1988, who was drafted by Portland in 
1986 but did not come to the NBAuntil 1995, and Vlade Divac, a 21-year-oldmember 
of the 1988 and 1996 silver medal Yugoslavian Olympic teams. Divac was 
drafted by the Lakers in 1989 and joined the NBA that year. During this time period, 
 
a rookie player individually negotiated a contract with the team that drafted him. 
Salaries and contract length varied greatly. 
 
The introduction of team salary caps in the 1983 CBA was a compromise 
between owners and the players’ union, in return for 53% of NBA gross revenue 
being allocated to player salaries. The early cap level was below the payroll of five 
teams whose cap levels were frozen at their existing payroll (Staudohar, 1996). The 
introduction of the salary caps led to some inequities in rookie salaries. Teams 
could pay a rookie only either the league minimum, if they were at the cap, or the 
amount of room under the cap, in other cases. In 1987, for example, the third pick in 
the draft, Dennis Hopson, was paid a reported $400,850 for his rookie season, 
whereas the fifth pick in the draft, Scottie Pippen, earned $725,000 his first season. 
The first pick in the draft in 1987, David Robinson, earned a reported salary of 
$1,046,000 from San Antonio, the highest salary on his team by more than 
$250,000. 
 
Discontent among veterans at the prospect of unproven rookies earning more 
than they did and dissatisfaction with the inequities the salary cap was exacting on 
the distribution of draft pick pay led to the introduction of a rookie pay scale in the 
1995 NBA CBA. Under the terms of the 1995 CBA, first-round draft picks were 
given guaranteed 3-year contracts, with salaries set according to a published table. 
Teams were allowed to exceed the published salaries by 20%, and most did so. 
Second-round draft picks were paid the league minimum, and contracts were not 
guaranteed. 
 
Immediately following the introduction of this 3-year rookie pay scale, the level 
and composition of early entrants into the NBA changed. During the period encompassing 
the 1995 to 1997 drafts, 44% of the first-round draft picks were early or foreign 
entrants; only 20% of the first-round draft picks were juniors. In addition, four 
high school graduates were drafted with no college experience. Players sought earlier 
entry into the draft, knowing that the 3-year rookie scale would delay the attainment 
of hefty free-agent salaries. 
 
From 1995 to 1997, six young, foreign players were drafted. Rule changes in 
1989 allowed professional players to play in the Olympics. This change induced 
foreign players, who previously could not play in the NBA and also play for their 
home country in the Olympics, to seek entry into the NBA; the change also allowed 
NBA scouts to evaluate foreign players as they competed against a team of select 
NBA players. A surge in world popularity for basketball followed the U.S. Olympic 
“Dream Team” winning of the gold medal in Barcelona, Spain, in 1992. 
Although the first Dream Team dominated world competition, the U.S. team of 
NBA stars won only a bronze medal in the 2004 Olympics in Athens. The NBA is 
now searching globally for the best basketball talent. 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of salaries in the NBA became more and more skewed to the 
right (Hill & Groothuis, 2001) as pay for top free agents skyrocketed in the new 
agreement. The league pressed for individual caps on salaries during negotiations 
for a new CBA, following the 1997-1998 season. The main impetus for the 
hard-line stance of management during the negotiations was the $121 million, 
6-year contract signed by Kevin Garnett following his 2nd year in the league, while 
he was still under the rookie scale contract he signed as an early entrant out of high 
school. Fearing that this might be a portent of the future, the league locked out the 
players during negotiations. The new CBA signed in 1999, but effective for 1998 
draftees, was an interesting compromise agreement that established caps on individual 
player salaries, lowered the 3-year pay scale for rookies somewhat, added a 
4th-year option for teams at set percentage salary increases, set minimum salaries 
for players on an increasing sliding scale based on years of experience, and added a 
median player salary exception to the list of other salary cap exceptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
The addition of another year to a rookie’s tenure before free agency caused more 
players to seek early entry to the draft. For instance, in Table 1, we show that in 
1976, only six players declared entry into the draft and were not drafted, but by 
2004, 58 players declared for the draft and were not drafted. In addition, teams were 
more willing to accept early entrants. From 1998 to 2004, 74% of the first-round 
draft picks were early or foreign entrants; only 23% of the first-round picks were 
college juniors. The figures in Table 2 dramatically illustrate the effect of the rookie 
pay scale on the age of first-round draft picks: First-round picks in 2004 are almost 
2 years younger, on average, than their 1994 counterparts. Given these shifts, owners 
now find free agents and rookies are no longer close substitutes. In particular, a 
very talented new entrant becomes highly preferred, because he costs much less 
than a veteran player and is more productive. 
 
Roth and Xing (1994) predicted that unraveling accelerates when senior candidates 
are not close substitutes for new entrants. In their article, they further state, “It 
may be possible to develop quantitative tests of the effect of the availability of 
senior candidates on unraveling in the market for junior candidates by considering 
the markets for professional athletes such as baseball” (p. 1037). We suggest that 
changes in the NBA CBA provide just such a natural experiment to test the theories 
of unraveling, human capital, and option value. 
 
 
THEORIES OF UNRAVELING: HUMAN CAPITAL AND OPTION VALUE 
 
College basketball has long been the “minor league” for the NBA. As a minor 
league, it serves a dual purpose. First, it is a training ground where players can hone 
their skills and become more productive. It is where players move from playing in 
front of small crowds to playing in front of large crowds and on national television. 
Second, college basketball serves as a signaling device to provide information and 
sort players into the NBA. When players leave early, they have less experience and 
a noisier signal than a player who stays in college. When owners choose an early 
entrant, they choose a player who is both riskier and with less experience. 
 
 
Player’s Decision for Early Entry 
 
Consider an individual who decides whether to wait one more year to enter the 
NBA. The rookie salary contract lasts for T years. An individual has an expected 
career of N years, N > T.1 Let A equal a player’s ability when he decides whether to 
enter the league or wait 1 year. Staying in school one more year would add to one’s 
ability.2 One could argue that those with lower ability have more to gain from staying 
in school. Alternatively, if staying in school tends to increase ability by a given 
percentage, then the more able have more to gain from staying in school. We 
assume that the increase in ability from staying in school, α, is independent of initial 
ability, A. 
 
Ignoring discounting, a player is paid less than the value of his productivity during 
the rookie contract.3 Let k equal the fraction of a player’s worth he receives during 
the rookie contract, 0 < k < 1. After fulfilling the rookie contract, the player is 
paid a wage commensurate to his ability. Thus, the career earnings from one who 
stays one more year, Wstay, equal 
 
The career earnings for one who enters the league now, Wgo, equal 
        
Thus, a player will enter the league now if Wgo ≥ Wstay or if 
   
 
Note A* is positive for Wstay > 0. Only those with ability of at least A* will leave 
school early. With a given distribution of A, the larger A* is, the fewer individuals 
there are who leave early. We have 
      
 
If the increase in ability from staying in school is larger (dα > 0), fewer individuals 
leave early. The less rookies are underpaid (dk > 0), the fewer individuals there 
are who leave early. The longer one’s expected career (dN > 0) is, the fewer individuals 
there are who leave early. Finally, an increase in the length of the rookie contract 
(dT > 0) results in more individuals leaving early. 
 
 
Firm’s Decision for Early Entry—Human Capital 
 
Becker (1993) argues that employees will pay for general training. Consider 
the standard two-period human capital investment model. In period 1, employees 
undertake training that will increase their marginal revenue product (MRP) in all 
firms in an industry. If the employees’ wage during this period (W1) exceeds the 
employee’s MRP during this period (MRP1), then the firm can only recoup this 
investment cost if the MRP of the employee in period 2 (MRP2), posttraining, 
exceeds the wage paid during this period (W2), which, with general human capital, 
usually can not occur. One paid less than one’s MRP will quit, unless there is some 
monopsonistic power by firms. 
 
In professional sports, leagues use a variety of methods to ensure that the cost of 
general training is not borne by teams. In football and basketball, professional franchises 
have typically allowed the bulk of general training to be performed by colleges. 
Early entry erodes this approach. In baseball and hockey, professional teams 
have traditionally used minor league affiliates to provide training. These minor 
league teams are subsidized by the major league parent franchises. To recoup their 
training costs, leagues do not allow players to become free agents until they have 
been in the major league for a certain time period. In baseball, players must be in the 
major league for six seasons before they can opt for free agency. This approach is 
designed to provide teams a period of time in which overall player MRPs exceed 
wages so that teams can recoup investment in players in the minors, but it obviously 
involves some cross-subsidization (Hill, 1985). 
 
In the years following the Haywood decision, teams in the NBA were free to 
draft players who had not completed college. The figures in Table 1 suggest that 
from 1976 to 1994, teams in the NBA, in general, drafted only college juniors. The 
human capital model would suggest, lacking a framework in which to recoup 
investment in general on-the-job (OTJ) training costs, franchises were reluctant to 
draft a player whose MRP would not at least equal his wage. 
This approach dramatically shifted with the addition of the “rookie scale’ in the 
1995 NBA CBA. With first-round draft picks locked into 3-year contracts with a 
predetermined salary, teams could now draft earlier entrants who might require 
some general training, as long as the teams could recoup these costs before the end 
of the rookie scale contract. The changes in the 1999 CBA gave teams even more 
incentive to draft earlier entrants. By lowering the rookie scale contract salaries and 
adding a 4th-year option for teams, at a predetermined percentage pay increase, the 
league and union added even more opportunities at the bargaining table for teams to 
recoup general OTJ training costs. 
 
Other aspects of the NBA CBA make the above scenario more likely. In 1999, 
individual maximum salary caps based on years of experience were added to the 
CBA. This could allow teams to pay superstar players a wage below their MRP. To 
increase the likelihood a team that drafts and develops such a player is able to retain 
him past the 4th year of the rookie scale contract and option, a team is able to offer a 
12.5% annual pay increase to players who have been with the club for three or more 
seasons but can only offer a 10% annual salary increase to others.4 For stars earning 
$9 million, this 2.5% pay difference is substantial.5 An alternative explanation of 
early entry is Lazear’s (1995) option value. 
 
 
Firm’s Decision for Early Entry—Option Value 
 
Lazear (1995) argues that risky workers are preferred to safe ones at a given 
wage, because the risky workers have an upside option value. Firms are willing to 
hire risky workers if they can dismiss workers who do not measure up and keep 
workers with upside potential. For this strategy to work, the employer must have 
some ex post advantage over other firms, such as costly mobility or private information; 
if not, the option value vanishes as the worker moves. In basketball, the rookie 
contract and provisions in the CBA may provide just this advantage. 
 
Previous studies have looked at the role of option value in the sports economic 
literature. For instance, Hendricks, DeBrock, and Koenker (2003) find in the NFL 
that “as long as the employer can eliminate poor performers . . . it seems quite possible 
that employers take chances on risky workers in the hope of finding ‘stars’” 
(p. 883). In baseball, Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) find that risky workers 
receive a pay advantage as long as firms enjoy some degree of market power. In the 
NBA, we explore the possibility that early entrants are, indeed, risky workers who 
thus provide option value to the team that drafts them. To examine option value in 
the presence of monopsonistic rent, consider the following model. 
 
Suppose an individual is under contract for a length of time T. After a length of 
time bT, b < 1, the firm may terminate the individual. The individual is paid W per 
unit of time. The individual’s marginal value product, Q, equals A +D. Assume A is 
a measure of ability that is known to all prior to the contract. Dis an ability measure 
(drive, perhaps) that is unknown to the firm but is learned before the firm may ter- 
minate the worker. Assume D is distributed continuously on [Dmin, Dmax], with a 
probability density function and cumulative density function of f(D) and F(D), 
respectively. Further assume E(D) = 0 and the firm has monopsony power so E(Q) = 
A >W. With π a firm’s expected profit, the probability of firing (respectively keeping) 
an individual given by prob(fire)[resp. prob(keep)], and the discount rate equal 
to zero, we have 
      
Now a firm will fire an individual only if A + D < W, or if D < W – A. Thus, 
 
Assume the firm can choose T, but b is exogenous. Clearly, for NBA teams, T 
and b are both subject to bargaining with the players’ union. In recent contracts, the 
union apparently has shifted wealth from new players to existing ones by allowing 
for a longer period before free agency and by accepting a salary scale for rookies. 
Assuming T is and b is not chosen by the firm (i.e., the league), the firm essentially 
treats the league-union bargaining as allowing more rent to be taken from rookies as 
T increases, with the union insisting on a given value for b to limit such rent extraction. 
If the firm or team is not constrained by b, it will terminate those with D <W– 
A once it learns D. 
 
One can ask how a representative team would set T to maximize π. The 
first-order condition (FOC) is 
 
 
 
An additional return to hiring risky workers in the NBA is the limit on what 
teams other than one’s current team can pay the individual once he is a free agent 
(that is, after the contract period considered above). The so-called Larry Bird rule 
allows teams to exceed the salary cap to re-sign their own players. Salary cap rules 
may prevent a raiding team from offering a player his marginal value product. 
Thus, a player who turns out to be highly productive may be retained if his team 
pays him more than another team can pay him, leaving some rent for his current 
team. The new maximum individual salary caps for players, added to the 1999 
CBA, undoubtedly suppress superstar salaries below competitive market levels. 
Overall, this model suggests that firms in the pursuit of talent will choose riskier 
players, ceteris paribus, to capture upside potential. To test both the human capital 
and option value models, we use a natural experiment approach, focusing on the 
changes in the collective bargaining agreements in the NBA. 
 
 
Empirical Evidence 
 
The change in the CBA provides an opportunity to test how incentives influence 
choices by both players and owners. To best focus on the changes, we estimate 
wage equations for two time periods, 1997 and 2002.We examine the effect of the 
rookie scale salary using a log-linear regression model. Salary regression models 
for professional sports are usually estimated using the log of salary to adjust for the 
large disparity in salaries between average and superstar players. Using the log of 
salary as the dependent variable helps to make the regression line more linear and 
reduce problems with heteroskedasticity inherent in such estimations.7 Performance 
statistics included as independent variables included points per game, 
rebounds per game, assists per game, steals per game, blocks per game, and turnovers 
per game. A priori, the coefficients of points, rebounds, assists, and steals are 
expected to be positive, whereas the coefficient of turnovers is expected to be negative. 
A dummy variable equal to one if the player is under a rookie scale contract is 
included in the model. An interaction variable of years of experience times the 
rookie scale dummy variable is also included. The coefficients of these two variables 
should give insight into the impact of the rookie scale on player salaries. Draft 
number is also included in the model, because the rookie scale is a sliding scale 
based on draft position in the first round. The regressions are estimated using all 
players in the league; older players who were drafted prior to the adoption of the 
rookie scale should also exhibit an inverse correlation between their salary and their 
draft number if the draft is an efficient indicator of potential. The number of years 
of experience and the number of years of experience squared are included to model 
the typical age-earnings profile. 
 
The model is estimated using 1997 and 2002 salary data separately. These 2 
years of observations were chosen to illustrate the impact of the changes in the 
rookie scale clause in the CBA. Because the original rookie scale was adopted in the 
1995 CBA, using 1997 gives observations with 1, 2, and 3 years under the rookie 
scale. The scale was changed for the 1998 rookie class; using the 2002 season gives 
observations with 1, 2, 3, and 4 years under the new scale. 
 
The results are presented in Table 3. The coefficients of years of experience are 
positive and significant for both years; the coefficients of years of experience 
squared are negative and significant for both years. The coefficient of draft number 
is negative and significant for both years. Performance statistics did not perform as 
well as anticipated. The coefficient of points per game is positive and significant for 
both years. The coefficient of rebounds per game is positive and significant for 
1997 but is improperly signed and insignificant for the 2002 regression. The coefficient 
of assists per game is positive for both years but significant only for the 1997 
regression. The coefficient for steals per game is negative for both years and significant 
in the 1997 regression. The coefficient of blocks is positive and significant for 
both years. The coefficient of turnovers is positive in 1997 yet is negative in 2002 
and is insignificant in both regressions. 
 
 
 
 
The results for the coefficients of rookie scale and of Rookie Scale × Experience 
tell an interesting tale. The coefficient of rookie scale is positive and significant for 
both years; the coefficient of Rookie Scale × Experience is negative and significant 
both years. When experience equals zero for rookies, then the overall effect of the 
rookie scale is positive on player salaries. When first-round draft picks are under 
the rookie scale and have 1 year of experience, the overall impact on salary from the 
rookie scale is almost zero in each regression. However, when years of experience 
is set equal to two and players are still under the rookie scale, the overall impact of 
the rookie scale is negative for both the 1997 and 2002 regressions. Adding the 
4th-year option to the rookie scale in the 1999CBAmeans that, for our 2002 regression, 
a player with 3 years of experience who is still under the rookie scale would 
see an even greater negative impact on his salary. 
 
The results of the salary regressions lend support to the human capital model. 
First-round draft picks are apparently paid more under the rookie scale than their 
performance would indicate in their 1st year in the league. During their second season, 
their performance and pay tend to approximate that of others in the league not 
under a rookie scale contract. However, in the 3rd year in the league under the 1995 
CBA and in the 3rd and 4th years in the league under the 1999CBArookie scale, the 
players are paid less than the value of their performance. Through the CBA, the 
NBA has set up an institutional arrangement that allows teams to capture the cost of 
general training that takes place during the first season in the league. 
 
In Table 4, median estimated salaries for the 1997 and 2002 class of rookies are 
compared assuming the player is under the rookie scale versus not under the rookie 
scale. The difference between these two salaries is offered as a proxy for the rent the 
player receives on new first-round picks. We calculate the medians using exp(xriβ), 
where xri is the means of the variables of the players under the rookie contract with 
either 0, 1, 2, or 3 years of experience. In the first column, the rookie dummy is 
coded as 1, indicating the rookie is covered by the contract. In the second column, 
the rookie dummy is coded as 0, which estimates what a rookie would have earned 
if not covered by the rookie contract. For the 1997 group, players earn more than 
their market value in their first season. Teams earn a surplus during the players’ next 
two seasons. The total rent going to team owners is estimated at $539,141. For the 
2002 group, players earn a surplus in their first two seasons. Teams reap a surplus 
in the next two seasons because there is a 4th-year option for these rookies. Overall, 
the estimated rent for teams is $1,294,917. This result is consistent with the 
firm-specific human capital rent-sharing hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
To examine whether the application of the human capital model can explain 
early entry into the NBA, we shall use a measure of player performance called the 
efficiency formula. As reported byNBA.com, this index is calculated on a per game 
basis as (points + rebounds + assists + steals + blocks) – ((field goals attempted – 
field goals made) + (free throws attempted – free throws made) + turnovers). The 
figures on player efficiency, presented in Table 5, lend support to the human capital 
model as an explanation for the increase in early entry into the NBA. Player efficiency 
rises for players’ first four seasons in the league no matter what their level of 
college experience, with the exception of players with 2 years of college between 
their third and fourth seasons. If early seasons represent OTJ training for players, 
the rise in productivity is dramatic between the first and fourth seasons and is even 
more so for players with little or no college experience. 
 
If teams invest in player human capital in their early seasons, it seems logical to 
expect that minutes played per game would be lower in early seasons and rise with 
tenure in the league. The numbers in Table 6 on minutes played per game confirm 
this. First-round picks average more minutes played per game during each of their 
first 4 years in the NBA. Although players with two or more years of college play 
more minutes than those with 1 year of college or with no college experience, the 
first two seasons in the league, this situation is soon reversed. The figures in Tables 
5 and 6 lend support to the human capital model as an explanation for early entry 
into the NBA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To empirically test Lazear’s option value model, consider two groups: early 
entrants and 4-year college entrants. The signal for the early entrant is expected to 
be noisier and riskier than for the 4-year college performer. Thus, we predict that 
when the cost of choosing a lemon falls, more early entrants will be selected. In the 
NBA, costs fell with the CBA in both 1995 and 1999. To test if option value matters, 
we focus on both the upper and lower tail of the distribution. In Table 7, we focus on 
the lower tail and look at players who wash out of the NBA in their first 4 years. We 
find that only 1 of the 31 early entrants from the 1989 through 1994 drafts failed to 
stay in the NBA for his first 4 years. For the 1995 through 1999 draftees, when 
rookie scale measures were in effect, 6 out of 58 early entrants failed to stay in the 
NBA for 4 years. These results suggest that we can not reject the option value 
model. 
 
To further test the impact of option value, we estimate an all-star equation to see 
if early entrants are more likely to be all-stars. All-star status is used because it is 
one measure of a player being in the upper tail of talent. 
Consider the following equation: 
 
 
 
where AS is all-star status and equals 1 if the NBA player is on the all-star team. xβ 
is a vector of explanatory variables where we specify three separate models. In all 
three specifications, we include early entry, which is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
player did not have a complete college career; years in the league; years in 
the league squared; height; weight; and White, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
player was White and equal to 0 otherwise. The second specification also includes 
draft number. The third specification adds the efficiency measure. The models are 
estimated using a random effects probit model for a panel study. In our panel, we 
have 5,132 observations on 1,092 players. The panel length varies from 1 year to 13 
years, depending on how long the player’s career is and whether the panel is right or 
left censored. The average length of the panel is 4.7 years. 
 
We report the results of the random effects probit in Table 8. In all specifications, 
the coefficient on years in the league is positive, whereas years squared is negative. 
Both are statistically significant. This result supports the OTJ hypothesis that players 
gain human capital with increased experience in the league. The negative coefficient 
on years squared supports the hypothesis that athletic skill declines with age. 
 
 
 
 
When focusing on early entry, we find in the first specification that the coefficient 
is positive and significant, supporting the unraveling conjecture: In the pursuit 
of talent, teams draft future all-star players earlier. This lends support to the option 
value model: Teams pursue players with upside potential. Early entry becomes 
insignificant, however, once we control for draft number. The coefficient on draft 
number is negative and significant, indicating the draft is efficient in sorting talent. 
 
In the third specification, we also include the efficiency measure. The coefficient 
on efficiency is positive and significant, showing that skill is indeed important 
in determining all-star status. In this specification, draft number is negative and significant, 
whereas early entry is insignificant. Overall, the results tend to lend slight 
support to the option value model of unraveling in the labor market. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Roth and Xing (1994) suggest that professional sports provide a laboratory to 
observe what causes jumping-the-gun equilibriums in labor markets. We suggest 
that the changing institutional structures in the NBA CBA provide incentives to 
both employers and employees to change the timing of entry decisions. Indeed, 
early entry in the NBA is becoming common. In 2003, the first pick in the NBA 
draft was a high school senior with no college experience, and 21 of the first 29 
picks were not college seniors. We suggest that early entry is a modified form of 
unraveling in a labor market, as firms attempt to secure the most promising player 
and players wish to lengthen their careers. We also suggest that the recent NBA 
contract, particularly the lowering of the fixed wage contract and the lengthening of 
rookie contracts, has given firms the ability to pay for general human capital. 
 
Our analysis shows that players who enter early improve more quickly and play 
fewer minutes in their 1st year than do those with 4 years of college experience. Our 
results suggest teams in the pursuit of talent are willing to take players who are less 
skilled than in the past. With the addition of the 4th-year option to the rookie scale, 
both teams and players have incentives for early entry for players to obtain additional 
skills on the job instead of in the NCAA. Our results also lend slight support 
to the option value hypothesis that firms select players early to capitalize on upside 
potential. Last, we suggest that early entry is particularly true for young, superstar 
athletes. With these players, teams not only capitalize on the rookie scale, but they 
also use the maximum salary caps that limit superstar salaries. Thus, if a team captures 
a superstar early, it can exploit the economic rent from him for years. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. It would be straightforward to consider a situation in which N< T, but N is a random variable 
which can have values greater than T. Also, one could assume that an individual who waits 1 
year to enter the NBA reduces his expected work life by some amount δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Such an 
assumption would have little effect on the theoretical results. 
 
2. For a high school graduate, the decision is whether to go to college for 1 year. The possibility 
of a high school dropout entering the league is ignored. 
 
3. If we allowed for discounting, a higher interest rate would increase the tendency for players to 
leave early. 
 
4. In some cases teams are allowed to pay a 12.5% increase to players with only 2 or fewer 
years tenure with the club if certain criteria are met. 
 
5. Nine million dollars was the maximum allowable pay for a player with fewer than 7 years 
experience in 1999. 
6. The term  is omitted from Equation 2 because   for a maximum of π (Equation 
3). 
 
7. The Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was run for the regression equations in  
Table 5 and for the same regression model using salary instead of the log of salary. The chi-
square statistic for the 1997 model was 582.04 for the linear model and 0.46 for the log-linear 
model; the chi-square statistic for the 2002 model was 189.62 for the linear model and 4.51 for 
the log-linear model. 
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